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Previewsclever use of their model system. Sensory
neurons express the glutamate trans-
porter vGluT1 and are therefore able to
excite their targets in the spinal cord,
which include Ia-INs and motor neurons.
RCs receive input from cholinergic motor
neuron collaterals. Thus, the authors are
able to activate Ia-INs and RCs by dorsal
or ventral root stimulation, respectively.
The authors confirm that the key connec-
tivity pathways from motor neurons to
RCs via recurrent collaterals and from
RCs to Ia-INs are also intact in the vGluT2
nullmouse spinal cord (Figure 1B). Preser-
vation of these inhibitory cell types and
their connectivity is accompanied by
nearly normal flexor-extensor alternation
in vGluT2 null mouse spinal cord when
the locomotor rhythm is initiated by the
application ofNMDA, 5HT, anddopamine.
Pharmacological blockade of inhibitory
neurotransmission results in synchronous
activity of flexor and extensor motor
neurons in wild-type mice and uncoordi-
nated bursting activity in flexor and
extensor ventral roots in mice lacking
synaptic glutamatergic neurotransmis-
sion. These results suggest that in the
wild-type mouse spinal cord, flexor-
extensor coordination may be achieved
as a balance between the excitatory
inputs that synchronize activity and inhib-
itory inputs that impose alternation.Further questions remain to be
answered. For example, it is not possible
to distinguish with the present preparation
and general pharmacological blockers the
different types of interneurons forming the
circuit, other than Ia-IN and RC, that may
be coordinating flexor-extensor alterna-
tion in vGluT2 null mice. There are multiple
inhibitory cell types in the spinal cord, of
which the Ia-INs and RCs are only a very
small subset. Indeed, within the V1 class,
RCs and Ia-INs make up less that 25% of
this population, with V1 interneurons being
only one of six inhibitory interneuron
classes in the spinal cord (Alvarez et al.,
2005).With the advent of transgenicmeth-
odologies, the mouse has emerged as
a model of choice for identifying various
components of the spinal locomotor
network. Many such studies have chosen
to target developmental markers of inter-
neuron subtype identity for genetic manip-
ulation (Goulding and Pfaff, 2005; Grillner
and Jessell, 2009; Stepien and Arber,
2008). This approach has yielded much
information about the properties of tar-
geted interneurons, their connections and
their role within the spinal networks. As
the search for unique molecular markers
for physiologically identified neurons
such as Ia-INs and RCs continues,
perhaps a lot can be learned from first tar-
geting broader populations in the mouseNeuron 71, Sespinal cord for which molecular markers
havebeen identifiedalready.Futureexper-
iments will probably exploit similar clever
schemes to test the role of specific inter-
neuron subtypes in motor behavior.REFERENCES
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Fundamental to behavior is the capacity to distinguish beneficial from detrimental environmental stimuli. In
this issue of Neuron, a new study by Morrison et al. shows that underlying these processes are qualitatively
different dynamical interactions between brain structures involved in processing the value of environmental
stimuli.In higher organisms, the systems respon-
sible for appetitive and aversive learning
appear to have a good deal of flexibility.Stimuli initially experienced as aversive
can become appetitive and vice versa.
For example, most people initially findcigarettes an aversive stimulus: they
smell unpleasant and inhaling the fumes
producesmild nausea. However, once theptember 22, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 959
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Previewssmoker comes to appreciate the effects
ofnicotine, thecigarettebecomesapower-
ful appetitive stimulus. Researchers have
studied this process in the laboratory using
reversal learning tasks. The subject learns
initial stimulus-outcome associations. For
example, they might learn that selecting
a picture of a dog rather than a picture of
a bucket will produce a monetary reward.
Once the subject has learned these
associations, the experimenter reverses
the contingencies without warning. The
bucket rather than the dog now produces
the reward and the subject has to learn
to alter their choices accordingly.
The orbitofrontal cortex has been par-
ticularly implicated in reversal learning.
This cortical area rests directly on top of
our eye orbits. Damage here in humans
produces deficits on reversal tasks (Rolls
et al., 1994). Patients with orbitofrontal
damage continue to choose according
to the old contingencies much longer
than healthy subjects. The orbitofrontal
cortex heavily interconnects with the
amygdala, which consists of a cluster of
nuclei buried deep in the anterior
temporal lobe. Although both structures
are thought to be important for reversal
learning, the exact nature of the interac-
tion has remained unclear.
The amygdala is a phylogenetically
older structure than the orbitofrontal
cortex. Early theories suggested that,
while the amygdala could be used to learn
stimulus-outcome associations, rapidly
reversing those associations required the
orbitofrontal cortex, thereby enabling the
behavioral flexibility evident in primates
(Rolls, 1996). This was based on the
observation that, although both structures
contained neurons that initially encoded
whether or not a stimulus was appetitive,
during reversal, only orbitofrontal neurons
seemed to encode the change in contin-
gencies (Rolls, 1996). However, subse-
quent studies found that amygdala
neurons, in both rats (Schoenbaum et al.,
1999) and monkeys (Paton et al., 2006),
could show rapidencodingof contingency
changes, casting doubt on the notion that
this ability was unique to orbitofrontal
cortex. More recently, it has been sug-
gested that the orbitofrontal cortex con-
tributes to reversal learning by predicting
likely outcomes (Schoenbaum et al.,
2009). Thispredicts that the reversal ability
of amygdala neurons should depend on960 Neuron 71, September 22, 2011 ª2011 Eorbitofrontal cortex, which indeed is the
case in rodents (Saddoris et al., 2005).
In this issue of Neuron, Morrison et al.
(2011) report results that paint a more
complex picture of the interaction be-
tween orbitofrontal cortex and the amyg-
dala during reversal learning. The authors
used Pavlovian conditioning to teach
monkeys that two pictures were associ-
atedwith outcomes thatwere either appe-
titive (a drop of juice) or aversive (a puff
of air to the face). The authors reversed
the picture-outcome contingencies while
simultaneously recording from the amyg-
dala and the orbitofrontal cortex. In both
areas, some neurons responded more
strongly when an appetitive outcome
was expected (‘‘positive’’ neurons), while
others responded more strongly when an
aversive outcome was expected (‘‘nega-
tive’’ neurons). However, these two popu-
lations learned the reversedcontingencies
at different rates in the two areas. Positive
neurons were faster to learn in orbitofron-
tal cortex relative to amygdala neurons,
while the reverse was true for negative
neurons. In addition, the authors report
functional interactions between the two
areas evident in the local field potentials
(LFPs). During the presentation of the
predictive cue, therewas increased corre-
lation between the LFP signals of the two
areas, consistent with a transfer of infor-
mation between the two areas. Further-
more, analysis of the dynamics of the
process revealed that changes in the
amygdala signal tended to precede those
in the orbitofrontal cortex preferentially
during learning, while the opposite was
observed once the contingencies had
been learned. In sum, the results of this
study emphasize the bidirectional nature
of the flow of information between the
amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex and
suggest that unitary accounts of reversal
learning are likely to prove too simplistic.
Psychological theories have also sug-
gested that appetitive and aversive
learning may involve different underlying
processes. Formal models of appetitive
learningdescribehowwerepeatbehaviors
that lead to reward (Dayan and Niv, 2008).
However, applying such accounts to aver-
sive learning is not necessarily straightfor-
ward. Although in theMorrison et al. (2011)
study subjects were not allowed to avoid
the air puff, avoiding the negative outcome
is, in fact, the main objective of aversivelsevier Inc.learning. We learn to avoid the disap-
proving looks of our colleagues by limiting
our wine intake at the party, we learn
to avoid speeding tickets by obeying the
rules of the road, and we learn to avoid
monetary losses by not betting on the
horse with the cool sounding name. But
such learning introduces a paradox: as
learning progresses, there is less and
less exposure to the reinforcing aversive
outcome. Indeed, in the fully learned state
wealwaysmanage toavoid theunpleasant
outcome. By standard reinforcement
learning theory, this situation should
produce extinction, yet robust avoidance
learning is readily obtained. An influential
two-process theory (Mowrer, 1947) sug-
gests that aversive stimuli must first
elicit a negative emotional state through
Pavlovian conditioning. Responses that
terminate the stimulus are then reinforced
by the reduction of the negative emotional
state. Perhaps the differential flow of
information between the amygdala and
orbitofrontal cortex during appetitive and
aversive learning reflects the recruitment
of these different processes.
In conclusion, the Morrison et al. (2011)
results are an important challenge to cur-
rent theories of orbitofrontal and amyg-
dala function. A dominant view in the field
is that orbitofrontal cortex is responsible
for coding the value of choice options,
with value represented on a continuum
from aversive to appetitive (Litt et al.,
2011; Morrison and Salzman, 2009;
Roesch andOlson, 2004). However, by ex-
tending these results to learning, theMorri-
son et al. (2011) study shows that aversive
learning and appetitive learning are not
simply mirror images of one another.
Instead, they involve qualitatively different
dynamic interactionsbetweenpopulations
of appetitive-preferring and aversive-
preferring neurons in the orbitofrontal
cortex and amygdala. These different in-
teractions could, in turn, reflect qualita-
tively different learning mechanisms. If so,
the challenge is to identify exactly what
the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala are
contributing to these learning processes.REFERENCES
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